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Abstract
We model knowledge diffusion in a population of agents situated on a
network, interacting only over direct ties. Some agents are by nature traders,
others are by nature “givers”: traders demand a quid pro quo for information
transfer; givers do not. We are interested in efficiency of diffusion and explore
the interplay between the structure of the population (proportion of traders),
the network structure (clustering, path length and degree distribution), and
the scarcity of knowledge. We find that at the global level, trading (as opposed
to giving) reduces efficiency. At the individual level, highly connected agents
do well when knowledge is scarce, agents in clustered neighbourhoods do
well when it is abundant. The latter finding is connected to the debate on
structural holes and social capital.
1 Introduction
This paper examines the relationship between the architecture of an industrial R&D
network and efficiency in knowledge distribution, both from the point of view of
individual firm performance, and at the level of the system.
Recent technological changes have had the effect of creating multi-product firms:
the knowledge base on which both production and innovation are founded has, in
general, become much broader, covering more, and different types of knowledge
(Granstrand and Sjolander, 1996). As a consequence, firms increasingly discover
that their in-house knowledge is not sufficient for efficient production or innovation.
This had driven them to seek the knowledge they need outside, in other firms.
However, and precisely due to the nature of knowledge, this task is difficult to
achieve through pure market interaction. Thus, firms are now forming relatively long
term alliances, formal and informal, with other, often competing, firms. This has
1
led to the networked organization, a hybrid organizational form lying between the
market and a pure hierarchy (Powell, 1990), which takes advantage of both market
and non-market interactions. Networks supply firms with rapid, flexible access to
resources outside their core competencies. Strong, stable contacts with other firms
can provide a firm with the knowledge it needs for its immediate production or
innovation without navigating the difficulties of market transactions for knowledge.
In addition, contacts of this type can also provide a form of insurance — giving
a firm rapid access to information about developments taking place in other firms
or related industries. These observations are particularly relevant to knowledge-
intensive, and science-based industries.
There is now a large literature, much located in the management field, examining
the structural properties of innovation or R&D networks. Three properties recur.
Networks tend to be sparse. That is, of the total possible connections between
agents, the actual connections constitute a small proportion. Networks tend to
be locally dense. Local clusters of closely interconnected agents are common. In
addition though, the local clusters tend to be only sparsely connected to each other.
Finally, the distribution of links over agents tends to be highly skewed. It is probably
too strong to say there is common evidence of power law distributions, but relatively
heavy tails do exist. The discussion in the literature concerns how these properties
arise, and how firms’ performance is affected by them.
As to the relationship between network position and performance, there are
roughly speaking two competing views. On the one hand, following Coleman (1988),
it is possible to argue that dense sub-groups are a source of social capital.1 A group
of highly inter-connected agents generates trust, common languages and problem-
solving heuristics, social disapprobation for opportunistic behaviour and so on. If
firms i and j are linked, they can share information about a common partner k. This
reduces significantly the incentives for k to behave opportunistically against, j, even
if he will never see j again, since information about his behaviour will travel rapidly
to i and to all the other members of the clique. More positively, if i is working on a
problem, using information gathered from j and k, or in discussion with j and k, an
ability of j and k to discuss the problem with each other, or exchange information
about it, can only have a positive effect on i’s ability to solve his problem. These
considerations imply that structurally embedded partnerships will be important
sources of value for a firm, and redundant links are privately, and probably also
socially valuable.2 Thus for a firm, a useful link formation strategy is to close
open triangles, and create strong cliques. The value of this strategy is observed in
empirical studies by Dyer and Nobeoka (2000), on the automobile industry; Gulati
and Gargiulo (1999) in a study of alliance formation in several industries; Powell et
1See also Walker et al. (1997) on the same subject.
2The third link that closes a triangle can be seen as redundant since its effect is simply to create
a path of length one between two agents where a path of length 2 already existed. Notice here
that “redundant” is only strongly applicable if this reduction in path length serves no purpose,
that is, if in general path lengths are not (privately) important.
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al. (1996) who study the impact of network position on innovation performance in
the biotechnology sector; and Rowley et al. (2000) in a study of strong and weak
ties in innovation networks in the steel and semiconductor industries.
On the other hand, Burt (1992) argues that dense local links are redundant in a
strong sense, that the existence of structural holes in a firm’s ego network is efficient,
and that locally dense networks can be a source of rigidity. A structural hole exists
if two of my neighbours are not linked to each other. Through these two neighbours
I am connected to different parts of the larger network, and thus have access to
different sources of dispersed information. Thus if a firm is to form a new link,
closing a structural hole is less valuable than finding a partner to whom none of my
current partners is currently connected. This is closely related to the argument of
Podolny (1993), that firms attempt to increase their betweenness centrality. If many
shortest paths between firms go through firm i, then i can exert considerable control
over knowledge flows. Particularly in the knowledge economy, control of knowledge
flows can be translated into rents. This is an argument that clique spanning ties are
valuable. The value of structural holes has been examined empirically by, for exam-
ple, Ahuja (2000) in the context of the international chemical industry (structural
holes have a negative impact on industry performance, whereas indirect and direct
ties have a positive impact on firm innovative performance); Gargiulo and Bennassi
(2000) who find in a study of an Italian IT firm that dense local networks do not
respond well to change (they find a trade-off associated with the safety conferred
by cohesive ties (social capital) and the flexibility conferred by ties that connect
different parts of a network); Baum et al. (2003) study the sources of inter-clique
link formation in the Canadian merchant banking industry.
This debate between social capital and structural holes is formalized through
the notion of clustering. An agent’s ego network is clustered if many of its partners
are partners of each other. The structural holes argument claims that a highly
clustered ego network is bad for performance; the social capital position argues the
opposite. At an aggregate level, individual clustering levels can be averaged to
describe an industry (or sector or economy) network. By extension, the structural
holes argument implies that unclustered networks will perform well, whereas the
social capital position argues that locally dense networks, which by definition are
highly clustered, will perform well. One way in which these positions are sometimes
reconciled (see for example Rowley et al., 2000) is that they apply to different
moments in an industry life cycle. When an industry is young, technologies are being
explored, and many different avenues of advance are potentially fruitful. Here, it is
important to have rapid access to “distant” (both in geographical and technological
space) information. Thus redundant ties are less valuable than ties that connect to
different parts of the network. Structural holes are desirable. However, in a more
mature industry, there are fewer technological surprises, so exploitation is more
common. Here, a dense core of agents addressing similar issues creates the critical
mass that is necessary to make further progress along the chosen path. Social capital
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becomes more valuable.
While clustering has received much attention in the literature, there is a second
aspect of structure that is now considered important. This is the distribution of
edges over nodes, and in particular the extent to which this distribution is skewed,
with a few nodes having many links and the majority having few. Though the
skewness of the degree distribution is relatively well established (see Powell et al.,
2005 for example), its implications for R&D networks are not well understood. The
genesis of a skewed distribution lies in some form of “preferential attachment”: firms
with many existing links are likely to be valuable partners, and so attract more links.
On the face of it, this is intuitively appealing, since a large number of partnerships
indicates that a firm both has useful knowledge and knows how to collaborate.
But a skewed distribution implies the presence of stars in the network — agents
through whom many (short) paths run. Consequently, while this structure is robust
to random failures (since the failure of a randomly selected node affects most likely
affects only a few other nodes), it is very fragile to specific failures (if a star fails,
many other nodes, and paths between many pairs of nodes, are affected). Stars in
a network can serve as important centres of knowledge distribution, and so a highly
skewed network may be conducive to very rapid diffusion of knowledge. On the
other hand, though, if a star ceases to participate in the system for some reason,
this can cause a serious disruption in the distribution system, and if the situation is
such that agents withdraw from the system from time to time (for whatever reason)
a flatter link distribution may be preferable.
While network structure will clearly have an effect on the efficiency of diffusion,
structure may interact with the micro-specifics of exchange. The transmission of
knowledge, particularly among competing firms, is a challenge for economists, es-
pecially if there is no market for knowledge. Two patterns of transmission have
been observed empirically. Allen (1983) describes “collective invention” in which
knowledge is given away as a (local) gift. In the steel industry in Cleveland U.K. in
the mid 19th century, for example, steel producers met regularly under the auspices
of societies like the Cleveland Institute of Engineers, the South Wales Institution
of Engineers or the national Iron and Steel Institute and disclosed their own recent
technological developments. As a producer made an advance in furnace height or
temperature, for example, that producer would document the change — how it was
accomplished, the technical effects and so on — and present this to other local firms.
Knowledge was essentially given away to competitors within the local cluster, and as
a consequence, the technology developed rapidly.3 Von Hippel (1987) on the other
hand documents a barter exchange. Technical managers of steel mini-mills in the
US exchange technical information and explicitly help each other solve problems.4
But here the transfer is not a gift: there is a quid pro quo. While the interaction
3McGaw (1987) finds a similar pattern in paper manufacturing in New England in the early
1880s, and Lamoureaux (1999) cites other examples from the 18th and 19th centuries in the U.S.
4Later work found the same phenomenon in aerospace and waferboard industries (von Hippel
(1998). Powell et al. (1996) document a similar phenomenon in biotech.
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is not market-based, there are social sanctions if an agent routinely receives but
does not give knowledge. In essence, knowledge is bartered. In both of these cases,
knowledge transmission is local, taking place in face-to-face interactions. If this rep-
resents the nature of knowledge diffusion, then the structure of local interactions will
play a central role in the process through which a “piece of knowledge” moves from
one geographic location to another, or more generally how it diffuses throughout an
economy.
These are the issues we take up in this paper. We are interested in how the archi-
tecture of the communication network affects its performance in terms of knowledge
distribution. This relationship may change, however, depending on the details of
the transmission mechanism. The model we construct below permits us to examine
both architecture and transmission as variables controlling knowledge diffusion.
2 The model
In general, for any agent, more knowledge is better from the point of view of produc-
ing goods, and the communication network is the infrastructure over which agents
acquire the knowledge they need in order to produce.
To capture this, we model a world in which there is a fixed, finite population
of agents, and a fixed, finite number of ideas relevant to production. An agent is
characterized by two properties: the set of ideas he has, and his production goal.
Production is controlled by a Leontieff production function for which only a small
number of ideas is necessary, different agents having different production functions.
Production is possible in isolation, but demands that an agent possesses all the ideas
that are relevant to his productive activity, i.e. the ideas for which his production
function has non zero coefficients. If one or more ideas are missing, they can be
acquired via an agent’s acquaintances. Thus the set of ideas held by any agent
evolves over time, and we shall assume this takes place through a simple process of
one-to-one exchange or gift.
Ideas have the feature that agents do not lose by giving. Thus it might be argued
that agents could well give without asking for reciprocity. If agents have to compete
in a second step, however, even without a loss to the giver his competitive stand
could worsen. Different industrial contexts will display different “terms of trade”.
in the present paper, we will consider a world of knowledge traders, a world of
knowledge givers, and a mixed situation in which both co-exist.
2.1 Network structure
Let G(V,N) be the undirected graph representing the industry network, with V =
{1, ..., n} the set of agents and N = {Ni, i ∈ S} the correspondence specifying, for
each i ∈ V, the neighbourhood Ni of i. The degree of firm i is the number of direct
ties of that firm
ni = #Ni.
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Average degree in the network is then n =
∑
i∈V ni/n. Any j ∈ Ni is at distance
1 from i. Indirect ties connect i to individuals at a distance strictly more than 1.
Define dij the distance between i and j as the number of edges in the shortest path,
or geodesic, connecting i to j. The average distance to i is then
di =
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
dij
and average distance (characteristic path length) is d =
∑
i∈V di/n. An additional
measure of the structure of local links is clustering. The extent to which i’s neigh-
bourhood is clustered is measured by
ci =
2
ni(ni − 1)
∑
j,l∈Ni
ξjl
where ξjl = 1 if j ∈ Nl and ξjl = 0 otherwise. It measures the proportion of existing
triangles among those which could involve i, given ni. The clustering coefficient is
c =
∑
i∈V ci/n. Though more sophisticated measures of structural position can be
designed, for our purpose the distribution and organization of direct and direct ties
as captured by degree, clustering and distance are sufficient.
Next we move to constructing a family of random graphs derived from an ordered
substrate. As a first step, consider the re-wiring algorithm from Watts and Strogatz
(1998) that has as a control parameter the probability p that a link in a periodic
lattice is randomly rewired. Start from the periodic lattice with an even number m
of nearest neighbours (ni = m, for all i ∈ V ) and sequentially consider each edge,
making a decision of uniform random rewiring (with probability p) or preservation
(probability 1 − p). As p increases the regular periodic lattice (p = 0) is left and
through intermediate states (0 < p < 1) a random graph with uniform degree is
reached (p = 1). This procedure creates a small amount of variation in individual
degree ni and an average degree of m is preserved as the total number of edges is
kept constant (it is exactly equal to nm/2, half the degree sum). We know from
Watts and Strogatz (1998) that there is an interval (the small world region) over
which clustering remains high while path length has fallen close to the level of a
random graph of average degree m. Indeed, when the number of random links is
small the removal of a few of them has a strong effect on average path length while
it has only little effect on the clustering coefficient.
Beside clustering and path length, we are interested in the importance of asym-
metry in the degree distribution. There has been extensive debate (see for instance
Barabasi and Albert, 1999) about scale-free networks (that is, networks with a power
law degree distribution having exponent between 2 and 3) and the extent to which
they can be found in empirical data. Scale-free networks and power law distribu-
tion in general are not our interest here. Rather, we will simply explore the effect
of having stars in the system, in addition to the possibility of having more or less
clustered random structures. We do this the following way. Assume now there are
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two classes of agents: s stars with degree di = D for i ∈ S ⊆ V, and n− s non-stars
with degree d ≤ D. The problem is now to design a procedure analogous to the one
above that permits to have both stardom s and randomness p tuned independently
while having a constant degree sum in the graph sD+(n− s) d = nm. To that end,
locate the n individuals on the circle. Take an even d ≤ m − 2, and sequentially
pick s nodes at random to form S. First the stars are taken care of: for each i ∈ S
create an even D = (nm− (n− s)d) /s links. With probability 1 − p, each of the
D links is connected to one of the D/2 nearest nodes on each side of i on the cir-
cle. With probability p, it is connected at random. That takes care of the stars
and creates also some links for the non stars. Then run across all the non stars
and proceed analogously, checking that the degree constraint for non stars is also
satisfied. Because only integer numbers are handled the procedure will in general
not create exactly nm links. However the results will be reasonably close to that
target. The 3-panel graph below summarizes a few statistics for an illustration with
n = 500, d = 6 and and m = 10, i.e. a degree sum of 5,000 which the algorithm
roughly preserves. The sum is displayed in the insert in the upper panel of Figure
1. The concentration of links (upper panel) falls monotonically with s, across all p
values. The two lower panels of Figure 1 show clustering and path length versus p
for s = 21, 107 and 500 stars. Clustering displays no significant variation with s,
while displaying its usual pattern with p. Also distance behaves monotonically with
degree, while the effect of s (owing to the assumption of a constant degree sum) is
monotonic and quite obvious. The algorithm thus behaves well and will permit us
to explore independently the effects of degree asymmetry and local disorder.
2.2 The dynamics of ideas
Over time, as ideas are exchanged, knowledge evolves. It never shrinks as we assume
that ideas display non-rivalry (i does not lose his idea by letting j have it), thus one
agent’s knowledge only increases or stays constant as times passes.
2.2.1 Knowledge as sets
Agents operate in a system (an industry) where there is a finite number of existing
ideas indexed with l = 1, . . . , `. Each agent is endowed with a subset of these, and
we denote Hi ⊆ {1, . . . , `} the set of indices associated with the ideas held by i ∈ S.
Agents use ideas for the sake of production. In that respect agents are heterogenous.
Production is done by agent i according to the Leontieff production function
φi =
{
1 if Pi ⊆ Hi,
0 otherwise,
(1)
where Pi ⊆ {1, . . . , `} is individual i’s list of indices of non-zero production coeffi-
cients. It is enough to have one l ∈ Pi /∈ Hi to be unable to produce (φi = 0). As
we do not necessarily have Pi ⊆ Hi, there is room for exchange.
Consider now j ∈ Vi (equivalently i ∈ Vj, as the graph is non-directed). Denote
now Ni = {l ∈ Pi−Hi} the set of ideas that i uses in production but does not have,
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Figure 1: Characteristics of the graph family: asymmetry in the degree distribu-
tion as measured by the Herfindahl concentration index (upper panel, pooled data
across p, the whiskers are the minimum and maximum values), degree sum (insert
in upper panel, again pooled across p), clustering coefficient (lower left panel) and
characteristic path length (lower right panel) for different numbers of stars.
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that is i’s needs. Then i is interested in j provided j has at least an idea that i uses
but does not have.i, i.e. Ni ∩Hj 6= {∅}.
2.2.2 Exchange
As for the “terms of trade”, a number of possibilities can be simply explored in the
model presented above. Suppose the sequence of events is that each time period
an agent is selected and engages in knowledge exchange with one of his neighbours
j ∈ Vi such that Ni ∩ Hj 6= {∅}. In a gift transaction, upon request from i, j
provides him with an element of Ni ∩ Hj with no counterpart. This captures a
situation in which agents tell each other freely, creating knowledge spillovers. In
a barter transaction, upon request from i, and provided Nj ∩ Hi 6= {∅}, an idea
is exchanged for another one. This is a trading situation, in which all ideas have
a common price, yielding a one-to-one exchange rate. In a mixed economy, some
agents give while some trade. This is controlled by 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1 the share of knowledge
givers. It is important to note that agents are not interested in all the pieces of
knowledge but only in those relevant to their production activity. This implies that
at some point trading can stop without every agent holding every idea.
3 Numerical experiment
A natural measure in the productive efficiency of the system is the average output
φ =
∑
i∈V
φi/n,
the proportion of individuals who actually produce. As in this simple environment
any agent either achieves production or does not, the φs consist of a collection of
0s and 1s and the variance in output is equal to φ (1− φ) , which is largest when
φ = 1/2 and smallest when φ is either 0 or 1. The settings of the experiment are the
following: a population of n = 600 agents andm = 10 links per agents (hence a total
number of 6000 edges); each agent is endowed with a set of ideas that is randomly
initialized by making each idea l available to i ∈ S with probability Pr{l ∈ Hi} = q.
The production function is a 200 category one, with Pr{l ∈ Θi} = θ = .1. All
these are independent from each other. Each period in the simulation, one agents is
selected, he activates a connection and they trade if possible. This process continues
until all possible trades have been made. To examine the space of graphs, we vary
the rewiring probability p from 0.001 to 1. For each p-value, 10 different graphs are
created and on each graph a single history is run, until all exchange possibilities are
exhausted.
The parameters are p, the degree of disorder; s, the number of stars (with lower
s-values corresponding to more asymmetry in the link distribution, see Figure 1)
and pi the share of agents who give rather than trade.
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4 Results
In this section we present the results of our experiment. As will be seen, they connect
well to some of the empirical results described in the introduction. We start by
examining performance at the aggregate level before turning to firm performance.
Results are presented under two initial conditions: one of scarcity, wherein initially
any agent holds only fifteen percent (q = .15); and one of abundance, wherein an
agent initially holds 85 percent of all possible knowledge (q = .85).
4.1 Effect of the density of traders
In the presentation of results, we suppress one parameter. The effect of the pro-
portion pi of agents who give rather than trade is monotonic throughout. As the
number of givers increases, total knowledge levels, or equivalently the number of
agents producing, increases for all levels of asymmetry in the degree distribution
and for all values of randomness in the network. The cause is clear. The absence
of a quid pro quo in exchange when givers are involved implies that when there are
many of them more exchanges will take place, and so a larger proportion of firms will
find the knowledge they need. In some of the other results which we discuss below,
the number of traders changes the strength of the effects we observe, but in every
case the direction of the effects remains unchanged. We thus set the proportion, pi,
of agents who give to five percent which permits these agents to have a moderate
influence on the diffusion dynamics, without swamping other effects.
In the figures below we present shaded contour plots wherein darker shades of
grey indicate higher values of the variable being examined. The axes in each plot are
p, the degree of randomness in network structure, and the Herfindahl concentration
index, as a measure of asymmetry in the link distribution. In each figure there are
two panels: the left panel shows data from the case of scarce knowledge in the initial
condition; the right panel corresponds to the case of abundance.
4.2 Industry production
A measure of industry performance is the proportion φ of firms that have been able
to acquire the knowledge they need to produce. We refer to these as producers, and
to those that have not acquired the requisite knowledge as non-producers. The re-
lationship between aggregate efficiency, the degree of randomness p and asymmetry,
is shown in Figures 2 a and b. The first effect, comparing the two panels, is that
not surprisingly, when knowledge is abundant more firms are able to produce. The
second effect concerns the number of stars, or asymmetry of the link distribution.
When knowledge is abundant, as asymmetry increases (or the number of stars falls)
efficiency decreases monotonically in a very clear pattern. The general decrease in
efficiency as the asymmetry of the distribution increases is explained as follows. If
there is a trading agent who has many links, his need for a quid pro quo can block
many trades, and close paths between many pairs of agents. This possibility can
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Figure 2: Proportion of firms producing, with scarce knowledge (left panel) and
abundant knowledge (right panel)
result in many agents not finding the knowledge they need. Clearly this possibil-
ity recedes when there are fewer agents dominating the linked distribution. When
knowledge is scare, the pattern is not monotonic: efficiency increases and then de-
creases as asymmetry increases, with the peak at about 400 stars. When asymmetry
is at its minimum, however (when every agent is a ‘star’), efficiency is still much
higher than when asymmetry is at its maximum (21 stars). The overall decrease in
efficiency has the same explanation as in the previous case. The non-monotonicity
of the relationship is explained, however, by a second effect, namely path length.
The possibility that knowledge transmission is blocked, as explained above increases
with the path length between sender and ultimate receiver. Thus shorter paths re-
duce this effect, all else equal. Increasing asymmetry thus has two effects working
in opposite directions: decreasing path lengths, and concentrating links in a few
agents. At an intermediate degree of asymmetry, efficiency is maximized.
It is possible to observe an effect of p in Figure 2, though it is of smaller mag-
nitude than the effect of s. Recall that increasing p increases the presence of struc-
tural holes, and by the same mechanisms decreases both clustering and path length.
What we observe is that when knowledge is scarce, efficiency increases with p; when
knowledge is abundant, efficiency decreases with p. In the former case, at the ag-
gregate level social capital is less valuable than are structural holes. Rapid access
to distant parts of the network is highly valuable in acquiring knowledge, and at
the aggregate level, short path lengths imply complete diffusion of knowledge. In
the latter case, with relatively high probability the needed knowledge is close in
network space, so a clustered neighbourhood will imply many paths between agents
that hold reciprocally desirable knowledge.
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4.3 Individual performance
It is less straightforward to examine performance at the micro level as the per-
formance of a firm must be compared to that of other firms in the same context.
We are interested here in the effect of the structure of a firm’s ego network on its
performance.
At the end of each run in our simulation experiments, firms can be partitioned
into two groups: those who have accumulated the knowledge they need to produce,
and those who have not. The obvious question is whether these two groups are
different from each other along interesting network dimensions. We answer this
by looking at two structural parameters of each agent’s ego network: degree and
clustering.
0.008
0.003
0.0015
A
sy
m
m
et
ry
 in
 li
nk
 d
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
(H
er
fin
da
hl
 in
de
x)
0.001 0.01 0.1 1
p
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
0.008
0.003
0.0015
A
sy
m
m
et
ry
 in
 li
nk
 d
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
(H
er
fin
da
hl
 in
de
x)
0.001 0.01 0.1 1
p
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Corr Deg Eff
Figure 3: Difference in degree between producers and non-producers
In Figure 3 we show the difference in degree between producers and non-producers,
averaged over runs at each point in the parameter space. The figure shows that in
terms of acquiring useful knowledge, it is valuable to have many connections — the
difference in degree between producers and non-producers is always positive. When
knowledge is scare, this difference is much larger than when knowledge is abun-
dant.5 In the former case, essentially only stars, having many connections, are able
to produce; in the latter, many non-stars are also able to produce. This explains
the magnitude of this difference. An agent with many connections rapidly acquires
the knowledge he needs, at which point he withdraws from the system (completely
if he is a trader, partially if he is a giver). In the worst case this disconnects the
network, in the best case it makes path lengths longer. This can make it impossible
for other agents to acquire the knowledge they need. This effect is severe when
knowledge is scarce, much less so when knowledge is abundant since many agents
will be able to produce from the initial period, and those who cannot are likely to
need only a few pieces, which are relatively easy to find. The two structural param-
eters, asymmetry of the link distribution and randomness of the network both have
5In both cases all observed differences in means are statistically significant at the 5 percent
level or higher.
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visible effects when knowledge is common. The value of having many connections
increases both as the randomness of the network increases and as asymmetry in the
link distribution increases. The latter effect is driven largely by the fact that stars
are more likely to produce than non-stars, and as asymmetry increases, stars have
more neighbours. The effect of p is driven by clustering. In a barter economy, a
clustered graph can alleviate the double coincidence of wants problem, because a
transitive triple provides a short path over which two agents can make an indirect
trade if they cannot trade directly. Thus agents with few connections can take ad-
vantage of indirect connections to get the knowledge they need. When there are
few transitive triples, it is very difficult to overcome a failed double coincidence of
wants, so there is a large advantage to having many potential partners, since when
trade becomes impossible with one of my neighbours, I can simply turn to another.
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Figure 4: Difference in clustering between producers and non-producers
Is having a clustered ego network valuable for an agent? Figure 4 shows the
difference in ego-network clustering between those who produce and those who do
not, averaged over runs at each point in the parameter space. This difference is al-
ways negative — a clustered ego-network is bad for information gathering. However
the difference is roughly an order of magnitude larger when knowledge is rare than
when it is common.
This is consistent with the structural holes argument given above. Access to
knowledge is vital in this economy, and in a clustered neighbourhood, links increase
local density rather than connect to distant parts of the network. If an agent is
part of a cluster, he will, in general have long path lengths to other agents. If there
is a piece of knowledge in a distant part of the network that the agent needs, the
longer the path to it, the more likely that on that path is a trader who, because he
has all the knowledge he needs, has effectively stopped participating in knowledge
transactions. Second, as the networks become less clustered, the negative value
to an individual of being in a clustered neighbourhood also decreases, becoming
statistically insignificant when there are no explicit stars. As the network itself is
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less clustered, the average distance from a particular agent to others in the economy
falls, regardless of the extent of clustering in his ego network. This provides another
route by which the effect just described is attenuated. The effects seen in these
figures are largely driven by the probability that there is a failure in the path between
an firm and the knowledge it needs, but when knowledge is abundant in general,
these failure probabilities will be lower in general, and so the effects weaker.
4.4 Givers and Traders
Figure 5 shows the difference in performance between givers and traders, measured
as the difference between the proportion of traders who produce and the proportion
of givers who produce. Traders always fare better, and the extent to which this is the
case decreases with the asymmetry of the link distribution when knowledge is scarce,
again explained by the dominance of stars among the producers. The explanation
for the superior performance of traders generally lies in the nature of knowledge
interactions. If a trader is involved in an interaction he always receives desirable
knowledge. If a giver is involved in a transaction, he only receives information if
he is the originator of the transaction. Thus the knowledge of traders grows faster
than that of givers, so more of them will be able to produce in the long run.
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Figure 5: Difference in performance between givers and traders
4.5 Particular neighbours
In the structure of the model there are two types of agents that might have a
significant impact on the performance of agents in their neighbourhoods: stars and
givers. The effect of having a direct link to a giver is shown in Figure 6. An agent
has in his neighbourhood a proportion of givers. In these panels we display the data
over the same range. We take the average difference in these proportions between
producers and non-producers. In the left panel of Figure 6 the data take values
only in [−0.01,+0.01], but are not statistically different from zero, whereas in the
right panel values lie entirely above 0.02, and are statistically significant. When
14
knowledge is scarce, having a giving neighbour has no effect; when knowledge is
abundant, being close to a giver significantly improves performance.
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Figure 6: Difference between the proportion of givers in the ego-network of producers
and non-producers
The effect of having a direct link to a star is shown in Figure 7 using the same
measure as above in Figure 6. In both panels of Figure 7 the data are significantly
negative. Having a star as a friend is never a good thing as it is almost always a
star who creates the hold-up problem by exiting from the trading process. When
there are few stars, each having high degree, the problem is strongest. The pattern
in both panels essentially tracks the asymmetry of the degree distribution.
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Figure 7: Difference between the proportion of stars in the ego-network of producers
and non-producers
5 Conclusions
We have observed in these results that the presence of “givers” in the economy is
generally a good thing. This is intuitively appealing in the first instance, as it seems
natural that if agents are giving knowledge away, knowledge flows will be facilitated.
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Traders function differently. In a networked economy, goods and services, including
knowledge flow from one agent to another through a path of intermediate agents.
At each step in the path some transaction is made. If it involves a trader, then
the transaction must benefit both parties. Thus if one agent on a path is no longer
interested in exchange, in our case, because a trader has all the information he needs
and so no longer makes trades, this eliminates any paths which flow through that
agent. Thus the model illustrates that a network with a skewed link distribution,
having a few stars, can be either good or bad. If the stars are givers, then their
knowledge can flow rapidly out to their many partners, and from there to the rest
of the economy. This will continue through the life of the economy. If the stars
are traders, because they have many partners, they will rapidly acquire all the
knowledge they need, and so stop trading. This blocks many paths between agents,
and in the most extreme case, can disconnect the network.
In the introduction we discussed briefly the debate between the structural hole
position and the social capital view. On the former, a non-clustered ego-network is
good for a firm; on the latter, a densely interconnected neighbourhood provides a
good knowledge environment. The model developed here permits some formalization
of the resolution suggested by Rowley et al. (2000). In section 4.2 we showed that
when knowledge was scarce, aggregate production increased with p, whereas when it
was abundant, aggregate production decreased with p. Average clustering decreases
monotonically with p. Thus when knowledge is scarce a network with structural
holes performs well; when knowledge is abundant a network with high social capital
performs well. A situation of scarce knowledge represents a young industry, in
which technologies are new, and firms are exploring the technological space to find
and create the best possible variant of their products and processes. For any firm,
the necessary knowledge is difficult to find, and may reside in distant parts of the
economy. Here, redundant links will be less valuable than links that create short
paths to other agents. A situation of abundant knowledge may represent a more
mature industry. A dominant design has emerged; most firms know what it is,
and have most of the knowledge needed to execute it. What is happening is that
firms are exploiting their versions of the dominant design, and need details rather
than new principles. Here, distant parts of the economy will have similar knowledge
roughly speaking to local parts of the economy, and what is necessary is to extract
the final details. Here, non-redundant links lose their advantage and we see the
force of the social capital argument.
One thing that is striking in this regard is that the economy and individual
firms have different responses to clustering when knowledge is abundant. At the
aggregate level, to recall, when knowledge is abundant output rises as clustering
increases, particularly when there are many traders. But at the individual level,
being part of a cluster is almost always bad (those who produce have on average
less clustered ego-networks than those who do not).6 The explanation may lie in the
6This is obviously a very rough generalization. Exceptions exist, particularly when there are
many givers in the economy, or when there are no stars.
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fact that when a network is highly clustered on average, a firm with low clustering
can connect different parts of the network. If it is the case that firms within a
cluster develop similarities, then a firm between two clusters can have access to
two different types of knowledge. This provides it with an advantage in terms of
finding the knowledge it requires. This appears to be so in our model even though
there is no strategic knowledge acquisition or control. It has been suggested by Burt
(1992), and also by Baum et al. (2003), that firms that fill structural holes in the
network can control information flows. In our model there is no notion of controlling
flows, but we do see the first necessary condition for such control, namely access to
different knowledge pools.
Efficient knowledge diffusion is the hallmark of a healthy modern economy. What
the model developed here shows is that the structures necessary to promote knowl-
edge diffusion depend to a very great extent on the details of the industry. Industries
or episodes dominated by collective invention, in which knowledge is (locally) freely
given, are very different from industries in which knowledge trading is the norm.
But further, how they differ depends on whether knowledge is scarce, as in a newly
emerging industry, or abundant, in a mature industry. When knowledge is scare,
random networks always perform well. When knowledge is abundant, and knowl-
edge trading dominates, clustered networks perform best from the social point of
view. Is there a role for policy here? When knowledge is scarce, socially, random,
unclustered networks perform well. This performance carries over to the individual
firm level: firms with non-clustered ego networks also perform well. So we observe a
coincidence between network structures that are socially and individually desirable.
The coincidence disappears, though, when knowledge is abundant. Socially clus-
tered networks are efficient, but any firm would prefer a non-clustered ego-network
— one abundant in structural holes. Here, this divergence between social and private
efficiency provides scope for intervention in network formation, at least in principle.
What this model has shown though, is that policy-making in this area is a very
delicate business — one size definitely does not fit all. The details about the state
of knowledge and the social conventions regarding exchange matter a lot, and so in
this area policy must be built on a very strong empirical foundation.
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